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ESSAY
ON TAKING BACK OUR CIVIL RIGHTS PROMISES:
WHEN EQUALITY DOESN'T COMPUTE
RICHARD DELGADO*
INTRODUCTION
Only some twenty years old, the "information revolution" has al-
ready subtly altered the landscape of legal disputing.' Although most
of the changes to date have been facilitative--enabling us to do better
the things we did before, such as researching cases, preparing docu-
ments, teaching certain materials, analyzing evidence, and billing cli-
ents2 -in one area the impact is likely to be powerfully substantive as
well. This area is civil rights, where the advent of computers and sophis-
ticated methods of statistical proof portends sobering changes in the
way we think about equality and racial justice. My reasons for believing
so consist of two observations plus a prediction. The first observation is
that computer-assisted analysis of data has enabled us to prove inequal-
ity more powerfully than ever before.' Inequality between Blacks and
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. J.D., University of California-Berkeley
(Boalt Hall), 1974. This essay was supported by a grant from the Ameritech Foundation. Charles
Church provided invaluable research assistance.
1. On statistics and the information revolution generally, see D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & Supp. 1987); HANDBOOK OF SURVEY RESEARCH (P.
Rossi, J. Wright & A. Anderson eds. 1983); R. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN REGRESSION WITH
APPLICATIONS (1986); B. LINDGREN & G. MCELRATH, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATIS-
TICS (2d ed. 1966). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1331-91
(2d ed. 1983); Peterson, Forward to Statistical Inference in Litigation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1983, at 1; American Association of Law Schools Section on Law and Computers, NEWS-
LETTER, Spring 1988, at 5 (history of the Section).
2. For overviews of this "facilitative" role of computers, see P. MAGGS & J. SPROWL,
COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN THE LAW (1987); Miller, Teaching Computers to Think Like Lawyers,
STUDENT LAW., May 1988, at 16; NEWSLETTER, supra note 1, at 11 (summarizing presentation by J.
Clark Kelso); id. at 16 (address of David Hambourger on "Law Office of the Future" Project);
Wiehl, Computers Assuming New Roles at Law Firms, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at B4, col. 3. But
computer-assisted legal research may be a mixed blessing; see, e.g., Berring, Full-Text Databases
and Legal Research: Backing Into the Future, 1 HIGH TECH. L. J. 27 (1986); Dabney, The Curse of
Thamus: An Analysis of Full-Text Legal Document Retrieval, 78 LAW LIBR. J. 5 (1986).
3. See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text. Discrimination can be class-wide or
individual. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 1, at 3-4. Redress can be based on unequal treatment
or disparate impact. Id. at 329-48. Legal challenges to inequality and discrimination have been
made in a multitude of settings, including wages, promotions, housing, credit, school arrange-
ments, municipal services, welfare, criminal justice, and jury selection. Id. at 11-12. See also Hig-
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whites, men and women, young and old can be made to stand out like
figures carved in a mountainside, so boldly and clearly that no one can
deny its existence. The potential for demonstrating this existed, of
course, in the pencil and paper age. But computers enable us, in multi-
ple settings, to show patterns of difference quickly, economically, and
with any confidence level we see fit to require. The proof-of-facts side of
a civil rights lawyer's life has thus taken a marked turn for the better.
My second observation concerns the law's response to this devel-
opment. And that response has been, simply, doctrinal retrenchment.4
Rather than accept at face value the evidence tendered by attorneys for
African-Americans, women, and others, our system has been telling
them, "You have misconceived our promises of equality. Equality does
not mean what you thought, and under the new, narrower version we
hereby announce, you cannot prevail." This doctrinal retrenchment has
exactly paralleled the advances in factual proof, so that the net result is
zero: redress for most forms of race- and sex-based discrimination is
just as difficult as before, if not more so.'
My final step consists of a prediction-that the process described
above is on a collision course with itself. The taking back of civil rights
promises is producing a gap between our story of origins6 and that con-
tained in current civil rights law. When this gap reaches a certain point
a crisis will occur, and one of two things will happen. Either our system
will adjust the current story in the direction of the original version, or
we will abandon our story of origins and drop the fiction that we are a
ginbotham, A Brief Reflection on Judicial Use of Social Science Data, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1983, at 7. Most complex statistical proof is documented with the aid of computers. See
infra note 7.
4. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
5. The spirit of this narrower version of equality in the sphere of affirmative action is
summarized in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 739 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring: "It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered discrimination immeasurably
greater than any directed at other racial groups. But those who believe that racial preferences can
help to 'even the score' display, and reinforce, a manner of thinking by race that was the source of
the injustice and that will, if it endures within our society, be the source of more injustice still.")
I am, of course, not arguing that advances in mathematical proof alone precipitated this
retrenchment. Rather, I maintain that, along with other factors (the country's increasing conserva-
tism, in particular), the advances made it likely to happen. On the idea that the structures by which
we process legal information shape legal thought, see Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the
Same Stories? Law Reform, Critical Librarianship and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV.
_ (1989) (forthcoming); Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984).
6. I borrow this term from Milner Ball. Ball, The Promises and Deficiency of the Story
of Origins in American Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MICH. L. REv. _(1989) (forthcoming).
The "story of origins" refers to those constitutive myths and ideals that we ascribe to ourselves,
that are taught in civics classes and churches, that set out what we, as a nation, aspire to be. See
infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. On myths and storytelling generally, see Delgado, Legal
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICHt. L. REV. - (1989)
(forthcoming).
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nation committed to equal justice. The forces propelling us toward this
confrontation are already in operation. The first Part of this Essay de-
scribes how computers have assisted attorneys in proving inequality.
Part II traces the law's response to computer-assisted proof of inequal-
ity for Blacks-namely redefining legal doctrine so as to make that con-
dition increasingly unredressable. Part III shows that when the gap be-
tween traditional notions of justice and what the law protects reaches a
certain point, we will be unable to conceal it from ourselves any longer.
We may then decide quietly to put flesh back on the bones of race-
remedies law. Or, probably even more quietly, we will decide that we
are not serious about equality, rewrite our history and story of origins,
and become a nation, like many others, built on tacit, permanent sepa-
ration of race and caste.
I. PROOF OF INEQUALITY-WHAT COMPUTERS AND STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS CAN Do
Computers can be programmed to carry out swiftly and accurately
sophisticated statistical analyses of large amounts of data.7 They can
hold certain variables constant and look for the effect of others (such as
race or sex).' They can analyze the contribution of dozens of variables
at once.9 They can test hypotheses, analyze variance, and determine
when and with what degree of confidence we can assert that a pattern is
unlikely to be the result of chance.' °
Lawyers have used computer-generated data in suits brought by
women alleging unequal pay, compared to men, in particular job cate-
gories, " and even greater inequality for work of comparable worth.' 2
Black litigants have used statistical data to show that patterns of hiring,
promotion, and firing for Blacks are worse than for whites and that
7. See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note I; R. MYERS, supra note l; Kaye, The
Numbers Game: Statistical Inference in Discrimination Cases (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REv. 833
(1982). Most complex statistical proof is carried out with the aid of computers. Peterson, supra
note 1, at 1-2.
8. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 1, at 77-100 (measures of minority group treat-
ment); 211-28 (matching, multiple regression methods).
9. Sobel v. Yeshiva University, 839 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988); D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra
note I, at 239-86; R. MYERS, supra note I; Levin & Robbins, Urn Models for Regression Analysis,
with Application to Employment Discrimination Studies, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1983, at 247.
10. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 1, at 63, 72-73, 287-328; B. LINDGREN & G. McEL-
RATH, supra note 1. See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REa. 338 (1966).
I1. E.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
12. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Int'l Union, U.A.W. v.
Michigan, 673 F. Supp. 893, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1987). See Norris, Comparable Worth, Disparate
Impact, and the Market Rate Salary Problem: A Legal Analysis and Statistical Application, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 730 (1983).
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these patterns cannot be accounted for by chance."3 Computerized
data have been used to show racial disparities in sentencing patterns
and in the rates at which probation and parole are granted and the
death penalty imposed. 4
Investigators and advocates for Blacks have shown that Blacks'
income is lower than whites', a difference that cannot be accounted for
by years of seniority or education."5  They have shown Black-white
gaps with respect to longevity,6 infant mortality,' 7  income,18
wealth,' 9 rates of criminal conviction,20 suicide and other forms of self-
endangerment, 21 mental illness,2 2 and drug addiction. 23 They have
shown that the disparities between whites and Blacks on most of these
measures are growing, not closing, 24 that the degree of residential seg-
13. E.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of
Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1980). See Corcoran & Duncan, Work History, Labor Force
Attachment, and Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3
(1979); Levin & Robbins, supra note 9.
14. Zeisel, Methodological Problems in Studies of Sentencing, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 621
(1969); D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 1, at 12, Supp. 1987 at 123-65; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987).
15. Hacker, American Apartheid, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Dec. 3, 1987, at 29, col. 1 (Black
American men earn only 60% of what white American men earn; making allowance for differences
in seniority and educational attainment of the two groups would close only a small fraction of the
gap). See also R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN, TIE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA
(1987) (analyzes census and other data on measures of Black emiseration).
16. Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97
YALE L.J. 923, 930 n.28 (1988) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNTED STATES 68 table 106 (106th ed. 1986) (Blacks' life expectancy four years shorter than
whites') [hereinafter CENsus]).
17. Delgado, supra note 16, at 931 n.31 (Black infant mortality is 94.1% higher than that
of whites); Black Infant Mortality Risks Studied, 132 Sci. NEWS 218 (1987) (Black infants born in
the United States twice as likely as white infants to die during first year of life).
18. Delgado, supra note 16, at 930 n.28 (comparing numbers of Black and white families
living below the poverty line). Bernstein, 20 Years After the Kerner Report: Three Societies, All
Separate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1988, § 1, at 13, col. I (Black-white income gap has widened over
the last 15 years).
19. CENSUS, supra note 16, at 45-47, 457 table 766.
20. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire (Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 637,
663 (1987); Delgado, "'Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense
of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQUAL. J. 9, 30-33 (1985).
21. Delgado, supra note 20, at 32-33; W. GRIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 55-74 (1965).
For a general discussion of life-endangering behavior, see Gibbs, Black Adolescents and Youth: An
Endangered Species, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 6 (1984).
22. W. GRIER & P. COBBS, supra note 21, at 154-80; see also Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
133, 137-39 (1982) and sources cited therein.
23. L. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY, 73-77 (1983); The Ghetto: From Bad to Worse, TIME, Aug.
24, 1987, at 18; Delgado, supra note 22, at 137-38. See N. PEPINSKY, CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES
211 (1980).
24. Delgado, supra note 16, at 930.
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regation is increasing in America's neighborhoods,2" and that racial
attitudes are hardening, not softening.2 6
Attorneys have used statistical analysis to examine the decisions of
particular courts or even individual judges in search for an unbiased
forum-or, sometimes, one biased in their favor.2 7 None of these tasks
was impossible in the pre-computer age; computers simply made them
faster and easier.
II. LAW'S RESPONSE TO THE INEQUALITY EXPLOSION-RETRENCHMENT
AND THE REPHRASING OF PROMISES
Aided by computerized analysis, attorneys have been vigorously
pressing actions on behalf of disadvantaged groups. Initially some of
these claims were successful,2" but recently successes have become rarer
and rarer.29 Instead, what we have seen is doctrinal retrenchment; as
the factual predicate for inequality claims advanced, legal doctrine re-
treated.30 The circle of redressable racism shrank as courts required
proof of intent to discriminate"' and demanded tight chains of causa-
tion.12 Changes were made in standing to sue," and limitations were
25. R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 136-57 (high degree of housing segregation
present in United States; segregation not any less pronounced for Blacks earning over $50,000 per
year); McLeon, Blacks Are Losing Integration Fight, New Study Claims, San Francisco Chron.,
Dec. 30, 1987, at A2, col. 5.
26. Gallup, Intolerance on the Rise in U.S., San Francisco Chron., Mar. 6, 1989, at A12,
col. 1. See Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. _(1989) (forthcoming).
27. Miller, supra note 2, at 21-22; Altfeld & Spaeth, Influence on the Supreme Court, 24
JURIMETRICS J 237 (1984).
28. Compare, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact
theory permitted for proof of inequality in cases brought under Title VII) with Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting this approach under equal protection clause). See also Melani
v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and the zig-zag course the Supreme
Court has followed in school desegregation cases, described in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 364-473 (Ch. 7, The Quest for Effective Public Schools) (2d ed. 1980).
29. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. Delgado, supra note 16, at 936.
30. Delgado, supra note 16, at 936; D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 165-77 (1987)
(retrenchment of race remedies doctrine); D. BELL, supra note 28. See also Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 57 U.S.L.W. 4705 (1989) (limiting reach of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976)).
31. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (fifth amendment equal protection clause
requires showing of discriminatory intent); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Wards
Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583 (1989).
32. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989); Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 451 (1984); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); D. BELL,
supra note 30, at 170-73 (burden of proving discriminatory intent is so great Blacks gain no benefit
from suspect -classification standard).
33. The Court has limited a plaintiff's standing to sue for racial discrimination (Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)), but apparently has loosened standing requirements in reverse dis-
crimination suits (Martin v. Wilks, 57 U.S.L.W. 4616 (1989)); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 107-11 (2d ed. 1988).
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placed on state action 34 and on the type of relief allowed. 35 Disparate
impact was sharply curtailed, 36 and in McCleskey v. Kemp3 7 the
Supreme Court devalued statistical proof-which all but the most skep-
tical would have found convincing-that Blacks are executed in Geor-
gia more frequently than whites. Thus, our response to Blacks' "You
promised" has been, in effect, "No, we didn't." Scarcely unprece-
dented-in everyday life we often do the same thing when reminded of
promises we now find inconvenient. Yet, the consequences of repudiat-
ing our civil rights promises are much greater than with ordinary ones,
endangering the uneasy social contract between the majority and mi-
nority races in our society. The next Part shows that the gap between
our original promises and the scaled-back versions we hold out today is
growing. There are only two ways to close it; each has costs.
III. THE FOUNDING STORY AND CURRENT ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW-CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN "THAT WAS THEN" AND "THIS IS
NOW"
Antidiscrimination law today increasingly has an ectoplasmic
quality-thin and more than a little pale. Its promises have a hollow
sound. But the hollowness is not that of the parent who, having prom-
ised his child something, tells him or her that the promised item will not
be forthcoming-straightforward breach. Rather, it is that of the par-
ent who insists that the promised thing was another, less desirable, item
entirely. A parent who does this too often, however, courts trouble;
sooner or later the child will demand an accounting. The growing enfee-
blement of civil rights law will spur a similar demand. In the ensuing
accounting, our starting point will be the original promises-those con-
stitutive ideals, principles, and narratives that form our founding story.
That story, our story of origins, 38 holds that our nation was founded on
mutuality and equal personhood. All men are created equal 39 and en-
dowed with fundamental human rights.4" What is more, those truths
are not just contingently, but self-evidently so;4 ' they are in the nature
34. E.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
35. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
36. See supra note 3 1.
37. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
38. See supra note 6. The story, like all stories, is in part aspirational. It deals with what
we wish to be true of ourselves--or, at least, what we wish to wish. We subscribe to these myths
more strongly in certain eras, such as the 1960s, than others. See infra note 48 (the story is losing
ground and may be rewritten).
39. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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of things and supply the cement we rely on to form a more perfect
42union.
This founding story is reinforced by narratives emanating from
dominant codes of ethics and the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this tra-
dition, all persons are equal in the sight of God.4 3 We must act toward
others as we would have them act toward us, respecting their humanity
just as we respect our own.4 4 We must love other persons as
ourselves.4 5
This founding story is taught in our schools, preached in our
churches, and enshrined in song and literature. It is part of our self-
concept as a generous and inclusive people. Yet, alongside that story is
set a much more somber one, a story of nonwhite people caught in pov-
erty, neglect, and despair. 46 In this other story, inequality is every-
where, and is everywhere unredressed. Law's story today tells Blacks,
"You may recover, but only if you satisfy us that your grievance meets
our definition of racism, which is of course much narrower than yours.
Moreover, you must satisfy requirements A through E and rebut sev-
eral defenses that we have decided to let the other side use against you.
You must wait several years for relief, and your measure of damages
should you be successful will be less than you might have envisioned.
Do you want to proceed?" Law's story and our story of origins cannot
co-exist much longer; the differences between them are becoming too
great.4 7 Soon we will have to decide between two ways of closing the
gap. We can adjust current reality in the direction of the original
promises. Or, we can decide in favor of present reality and forfeit our
42. U.S. CONST. preamble. Numerous commentators have recognized the ironic gap be-
tween the story of our origins as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the society that
took shape after the Constitutional Convention. Archibald Cox thinks it likely that the Declara-
tion of Independence held as equals those admitted to the political process, but reminds us that
excluded from that community were both slave and free Blacks, women, and the propertyless. He
also points to the original Constitution's lack of assurances of either equality or of the right to
vote. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 251 (1987). For an argument that the drafting of
the Constitution was motivated by the economic self-interest of the framers, rather than by any
egalitarian spirit, see C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1935). For commentary on the "Constitutional Contradiction" by which the
Framers traded Black enslavement for white privilege, see D. BELL, supra note 28, at 20-28; Del-
gado, supra note 16.
43. Gilson, Foreword to ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD at 24-35 (Image abridged ed.
1958); 2 Corinthians 8:14; Matthew 7:21-24; Romans 10:12 (no difference between the Jew and the
Greek; all are equal in the sight of God).
44. See supra note 43; Pledge of Allegiance ("one nation, under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all").
45. Mark 12:31.
46. See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
47. See B. BETTELHEIM, THE USES OF ENCHANTMENT: THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF
FAIRY TALES (1975) (one function of myths is to enable us to cope with discrepancies between our
system of ideals and the world as it is; at some point, however, even "a good story" will not enable
us to reconcile flatly contradictory versions of the world).
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ideals. The former course would entail putting new vitality back into
civil rights law. We could ease the requirements of intent and near-
straight line causation. We could define redressable discrimination
more broadly and take firmer steps to remedy inequality even when it
cannot be shown to have resulted from intentional discrimination. We
could re-examine the many qualifications, exceptions, and defenses we
have engrafted in antidiscrimination law. By such measures we could
indicate to outgroups that we are serious about including them in our
community. This course is costly; it will entail relinquishing privileges
and prerogatives that many of us now enjoy.4 We may well decide not
to pay this price.49 The alternative, however, is also costly. Its price is
the admission that our founding story, with its myths about brother-
hood, equality, and redress of grievances, is just that: a collection of
myths. We will then confront the somber realization that, as a people,
we are not serious about equality, that we embrace inequality and sta-
tus so long as they benefit us, and that in these respects we are no differ-
ent from the many Western and nonwestern nations that are built on,
and willingly accept, permanent, ineradicable divisions of race, sex, and
caste.
CONCLUSION
Computers and statistical analysis enable us to prove inequality
and unequal treatment more compellingly than ever before. But as our
ability to prove the facts necessary to sustain a discrimination case has
advanced, legal doctrine has retreated, with the result that civil rights
claims are exactly as difficult to win as before. As modern methods of
proof shone a bright light on the inequality in our world, we dimmed
the lights in doctrine, not wanting to see what was there.
But this has only postponed the moment of reckoning. The ine-
quality we banished by verbal trickery from our field of vision now
shows up in our spectacles. Doctrine's enfeeblement is now visible to
all; its promises no longer come close to matching those contained in
our story of origins. Potential claimants are beginning to realize that
our once-proud system of civil rights statutes and case law is not main-
tained for their benefit, that it has little to do with equal justice. We are
48. See Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (whites resist Black-justice claims unless these are costless, i.e., coincide
with white self-interest); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979) (same).
49. 1 believe this alternative is, unfortunately, the more likely of the two. Because of the
current climate-fear of Japanese economic competition and of crime, and the generalized sense
that we have gone "too far" in the civil rights direction-it will be easier than at any comparable
point in the past 30 years to rewrite the story of our origins and to take a new, less generous stance
vis-a-vis Black justice.
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thus entering the first stage of a civil rights crisis precipitated by this
growing realization. There are only two ways out. We can adjust the
promises contained in civil rights law back in the direction of the origi-
nal ones. Or, we can abandon our story of origins and face the realiza-
tion that we are no longer committed to the vision of equality and racial
justice it contains. Our decision will say much about what kind of peo-
ple we are and will become. To say that much will ride on it is an
understatement. 50
50. It is grimly ironic that after almost 100 years the paradox recognized by the first
Justice Harlan applies as though written yesterday: "We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our
people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law
which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-
citizens, our equals before the law." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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